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The Model Employment Termination Act: Fairness for Employees 
and Employers Alike 
By Theodore J. St. Antoine 
Professor St. Antoine is with the University 
of Michigan Law School in Ann Arbor. 
The Model Employment Termination 
Act (META),1 which state legislatures are 
expected to consider in the near future 
aims to prevent the unfair firing of Amer~ 
ican workers. At the same time, the Act 
aims to prevent devastating financial 
blows to American business. For both em-
1 9A Labor Relations Reporter (Washington, DC: Bureau 
of National Affairs) IERM 540:21(December1991). 
IRRA Spring Meeting 
ployees and employers, META offers 
streamlined dispute resolution procedures 
that would be simpler, less costly, and less 
time-consuming than the civil courts. The 
essence of the proposal is compromise--
not as a matter of political expediency 
but as a practical, balanced accommoda-
tion of the competing worthwhile interests 
of employers and employees. Workers are 
entitled to be free from arbitrary treat-
ment; business is entitled to be free from 
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unnecessary expense. MET A would pro-
mote both objectives. 
META was approved and recom-
mended for enactment in all the states by 
the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws at its annual 
meeting in August 1991. By states, the 
final vote showed 39 jurisdictions in favor 
of the measure and only 11 opposed.2 
That alone attests to MET A's merits. The 
Uniform Law Commissioners (ULC) are a 
cross-section of influential lawyers, judges, 
law teachers1 and legislators from around 
the country, with an average of about six 
persons in each state delegation. Bills are 
prepared by committees that meet two or 
three times a year for intensive 2-day 
drafting sessions. Bills are not adopted by 
the ULC unless they have been read line-
by-line at least twice during different an-
nual conferences. More controversial mea-
sures, like META, may take three or more 
readings. 
The MET A drafting committee con-
sisted of eleven members, with myself as 
"reporter" or principal draftsperson. Tra-
ditionally, drafting committees are com-
posed of generalists, with specialized 
expertise being supplied by the reporter 
and o~tside adv~sors. The MET A drafting 
committee received highly useful assis-
tance from representatives of the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Labor and 
Employment Law Section, the AFL-CIO 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, th~ 
ACLU, the National Employment Law-
yers Association, and numerous other 
groups and individuals. 
Unjust dismissal is a significant practi-
cal problem. Jack Stieber, former director 
2 Ibid. 
3 Stieber, "Recent Developments in Employment-at-
Will," 36 Labor L. ]., 557, 558 (1985). 
4 Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 519-20 
(1884). . 
. 5 See B. Bluestone and B. Harrison, The Deindustrializa-
twn of America, 63-06 (1982); and L. Ferman and J. 
Gordus, The Economy and Mental Health (1979). 
6 9A Labor Relations Reporter (Washington, DC: BNA) 
IERM 505:41 (February 1992); H. Perritt, Employee Dis-
missal Law and Practice (2d ed. 1987). 
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of the School of Labor and Industrial Re-
lations at Michigan State University, esti-
mates that "[s]ome 60 million U.S. 
employees are subject to the employment-
at-will doctrine and about 5 million of 
them are discharged each year." 3 He fur-
ther calculates that around 150,000 of 
these workers are discharged unfairly 
under the standards applicable in union-
ized industries. Until recently, the great 
mass of American working people had no 
recourse. Employers could dismiss their 
employees "at will ... for good cause, for 
no cause, or even for a cause morally 
wrong." 4 The economic deprivation of the 
wrongfully discharged worker is only part 
of the story. Numerous studies document 
the increases in cardiovascular deaths 
suicides, mental breakdowns, alcoholism: 
spouse and child abuse, and impaired so-
cial relations that follow in the wake of 
job loss.5 
During the past couple of decades, the 
courts in 40-45 jurisdictions have em-
ployed three main theories to carve out 
certain exceptions to the previously pre-
vailing doctrine of employment-at-will.6 
Those three theories include tort viola-
tions of public policy, or "abusive" or 
"retaliatory" discharge;7 breach of an ex-
press or implied contract, embodied in a 
personnel manual or an oral assurance at 
the time of hiring;8 and breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.9 
For both employers and employees, how-
ever, there are serious deficiencies in these 
common law doctrines. They constitute a 
weak reed, a fragile safeguard for the 
worker who has been wronged. And yet in 
a given case they can wreak havoc on a 
hapless employer who runs afoul of them. 
7 Petermann v. Teamsters Local 3%, 174 Cal. App. 2d 
184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), 38 LC~ 65,861; Tameny v. Atlan-
tic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980). 
8 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 4a! 
Mich. 579, 292 NW 2d 880 (1980); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill 
Inc., 57 NY 2d 458, 443 NE 2d 441 (1982), 99 LC~ 55,401.• 
9 Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96 
364 N.E. 2d 1251 (1977). ' 
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The tort or public policy claim will be 
limited by its nature to rare, egregious 
situations. How many employers, espe-
cially if they have the benefit of know-
ledgeable counsel, are going to order their 
employees to commit perjury or engage in 
an illegal price-fixing scheme, and then 
fire them if they refuse? To avoid a con-
tract obligation, all an employer has to do 
is refrain from making any commitments 
about future job security. Even if an em-
ployer has made such a commitment 
through a policy statement in an em-
ployee handbook, most states permit a 
unilateral revocation as long as there is 
adequate notice to the affected workers. 10 
The covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, which is potentially the most ex-
pansive protection for employees, has 
been accepted by a dozen states at most. 
Conceptually, as New York's highest 
court has observed, the extension of the 
covenant to cover wrongful discharge 
would not be so much an exception to at-
will employment, as a negation of the 
whole doctrine. 11 Most courts are not go-
ing to be so activist as to take that step. 
Finally, the great majority of successful 
plaintiffs are professionals or upper-level 
management personnel. Rank-and-file 
workers who are fired usually have too 
little money at stake to make their cases 
worthwhile for lawyers operating on a 
contingent fee basis. 
On the other hand, for an employer 
that does get ensnared in a common law 
wrongful discharge action, the results can 
be extremely costly. Various studies of 
California lawsuits found that a plaintiff 
who could get to the jury won over 75 
10 In re Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting 
Co.), 432 Mich. 438, 443 NW 2d 112 (1989), 112 LC 
~ 56,091. Cf. Enis v. Continental Ill. Nat'/ Bank & Trust 
Co., 795 F2d 39, 41(CA-71986), 40 EPD ~ 36,295. 
11 Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 
304-05, 448 NE2d 86, 91 (1983). 
12 Palefsky, "Wrongful Termination Litigation: Dagwood 
and Goliath," 62 Mich. B.J. 776 (1983); "Discharge Verdicts 
Average $424,527 in California," 9 Labor Relations Re-
porter, 1 Employment Rights (Washington, DC: BNA), No. 
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percent of the time and the average ver-
dict ranged between $300,000 and 
$450,000.12 Throughout the country, sin-
gle individuals have received jury awards 
covering compensatory and punitive dam-
ages as high as $20 million, $4.7 million, 
$3.25 million, $2.57 million, $2 million, 
$1.5 million, $1.19 million, and $1 mil-
lion.13 Company attorneys in Chicago, 
Cleveland, and Detroit tell me that even 
the successful defense of a discharge case 
before a jury will cost between $100,000 
and $150,000, while their counterparts on 
the coasts say that figure can reach 
$200,000. In addition, a recent RAND 
study indicates that the "hidden costs" 
incurred by American business in trying 
to avoid this onerous litigation, including 
the retention of undesirable employees, 
may amount to one hundred times more 
than the adverse judgments and other le-
gal expenses.14 
In sum, the central defects of the ex-
isting common law system are that em-
ployees' substantive rights are too limited 
and uncertain, the remedies against em-
ployers are too random and often exces-
sive, and the decisionmaking process is too 
inefficient for all concerned. MET A at-
tempts to address each of these problems. 
It guarantees the vast majority of workers 
certain irreducible minimum rights 
against wrongful discharge, but substan-
tially reduces the potential liability of em-
ployers. It also substitutes the use of 
professional arbitrators in place of long, 
expensive court proceedings as the pre-
ferred method of enforcement. That can 
also mean the elimination of wayward 
verdicts by emotionally aroused juries. 
14, at 3 (March 3, 1987); and J. Dertouzos, E. Holland and 
P. Ebener, The Legal and Economic Consequences of 
Wrongful Termination 24-26, 33-37 (1988). 
13 K. Lopatka and J. Martin, "Developments in the Law 
of Wrongful Discharge," in ABA National Institute on Liti-
gating Wrongful Discharge and Invasion of Privacy Claims 
vii, 13-18 (1986). 
14 J. Dertouzos and L. Karoly, Labor Market Responses 
to Employer Liability (1991 ). 
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"Good Cause" Termination 
For employees covered by META, the 
termination of employment would be pro-
hibited unless there was "good cause." 15 
Good cause could consist of either miscon-
duct or poor performance on an individual 
worker's part, or the economic needs and 
goals of the enterprise as determined by 
the employer in the good-faith exercise of 
business judgment. The term "good 
cause" was chosen instead of the more 
common "just cause," which appears in 
collective bargaining agreements, in order 
to emphasize the economic flexibility ac-
corded the employer, even though no dif-
ference in meaning was intended. 
Interpreters of the statute are directed for 
guidance to the arbitral precedent devel-
oped over the past half century, so the 
broad language has already been applied 
and given substance in thousands of deci-
sions. 
Examples of good cause for termination 
in an individual case include theft, as-
sault, destruction of property, drug or al-
cohol use on the job, insubordination, 
excessive absenteeism, incompetence, and 
poor performance. An objective standard 
exists here, with the finder of fact making 
the ultimate determination. Economic de-
cisions are primarily subjective, however, 
with good faith the only limitation on the 
employer's business judgment. Manage-
ment is entirely free to determine the 
nature and direction of the enterprise, the 
size of the work force, the location of 
plants, and all other similar matters. 
About the only restriction is that an em-
ployer could not concoct a sham layoff to 
rid itself of an employee as to whom there 
was no good cause for a termination, since 
that would violate the good-faith require-
ment. 
ts Model Employment Termination Act (META)§§ 1(4), 
J(a). 
16 Id., § § 1(1), J(b). 
17 Id., § 1(2). 
18 Federal preemption is unlikely. See Lingle v. Norge 
Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 US SCt 399 (1988), la! LC 
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Employers are also entitled to set per-
formance standards for positions in their 
establishments. Standards may be fixed at 
the loftiest level management desires, as 
long as they are not skewed to disadvan-
tage particular individuals. In highly 
competitive occupations, such as profes-
sional sports or legal practice, a perform-
ance standard could call for the most 
proficient performer available for a given 
position. 
META would cover most full-time em-
ployees (those working 20 or more hours a 
week) after one year of service with an 
employer.16 An exception exists for small 
employers, or those employers with fewer 
than five employees.17 Small establish-
ments may engage in some of the most 
arbitrary treatment of workers, but it was 
still felt unwise to interfere with these 
mom-and-pop operations. Initially it was 
proposed to exclude high-level, policy-
making executives, but management ad-
visors objected. A trade-off for protection 
under the Act is the elimination of com-
mon law tort and implied contract actions 
based on prohibited terminations, and of 
course it is well-paid corporate officials 
who are the most likely to have the big-
gest claims. Workers subject to collective 
bargaining agreements are covered to the 
extent permitted by federal preemption 
law.18 The inclusion of public employees is 
left to state option. 
Displacing Common Law Suits 
As indicated, a major trade-off in 
MET A is the displacement or extinguish-
ment of most common law suits based on 
terminations forbidden under the Act. 
These suits would include implied con-
tract claims and tort claims grounded in 
such theories as defamation, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and other 
similar theories.19 There would be no ex-
f 10,478A; and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 
471 US SCt 724 (1985), 102 LC f 55,497. 
t9 META§ 2(c) and (e). 
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tinguishment of rights or claims under 
express contracts or under statutes or ad-
ministrative regulations, such as those 
dealing with job . discrimination, 
"whistleblowing," and occupational safety 
and health. 
Remedies would be confined to those 
customary under the federal Civil Rights 
Act of 1964; namely, reinstatement with 
or without backpay and attorney's fees for 
a prevailing party.20 Severance pay is al-
lowable when reinstatement is impracti-
cable, up to a maximum of 36 months' 
pay in the most egregious cases. Compen-
satory and punitive damages are ex-
pressly excluded.21 
The preferred method for enforcing 
META is through professional arbitrators 
appointed by an appropriate state 
agency.22 Such persons have the requisite 
skill, training, and experience to under-
stand the special problems of the work-
place, and they will thus probably be 
more acceptable to employers and em-
ployees. Their efficiency in resolving in-
dustrial disputes is also likely to reduce 
the time and expense of the proceedings. 
One departure from arbitral practice in 
the unionize9 sector is that the burden of 
proof under MET A rests on a complain-
ant employee.23 That accords with the 
usual rule in the civil courts, but since the 
employer generally knows best why it ter-
minated the employee, the employer must 
ordinarily proceed first to present its case. 
Arbitral awards would be subject only to 
limited judicial review, primarily on the 
grounds of corruption, an exceeding of au-
thority, or a prejudicial error of law.24 
Who should bear the costs of these pro-
posed procedures? As a matter of princi-
ple, the new public right to be free from 
unjust dismissal, like any other public 
right, ought to be enforced at public ex-
pense. But most states are financially 
20 Id., § 7(b). 
21 Id., § 7(d). 
22 Id., §6. 
23 Id., § 6(e). 
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strapped these days, and the prospect of 
an additional and ill-defined fiscal burden 
could be the last straw for a measure that 
is bound to generate controversy. Recog-
nizing this, META suggests that as an 
alternative to the normal filing fee the 
states consider imposing a substantial 
part of the cost on the parties themselves, 
perhaps with a cap on the employee's 
share in an amount equal to one or two 
weeks' pre-termination pay.25 
Among the most hotly debated aspects 
of MET A are provisions allowing employ-
ers and employees to waive or "opt out" 
of the prescribed statutory rights and pro-
cedures. Thus, by express written agree-
ment, the parties may eliminate the good 
cause protections and substitute a 
mandatory severance payment of at least 
one month's pay for each year of employ-
ment,26 or the parties may agree on a 
private arbitration procedure to resolve 
their dispute.27 
Now, "freedom of contract" is a prized 
American prerogative, but the waiver of 
statutory rights in the employment con-
text is traditionally suspect. There is such 
disparity of bargaining power that work-
ers applying for a job will commonly sign 
any form an employer places in front of 
them. There are theories available by 
which the courts can minimize the risks 
her~conomic duress, contracts of adhe-
sion, and so on. Furthermore, the fairly 
generous severance pay schedule and 
other technical features of that provision 
may largely confine its application to 
higher-ranking managerial personnel. The 
courts should also demand that any pri-
vate arbitration system must meet strin-
gent due process requirements before it 
may replace the statutory procedures. 
Conclusion 
Adoption of META's "good cause" 
standard would not put this country at a 
24 Id., § 8(c). 
25 Id., § S(e) and Comment. 
26 Id., § 4(c) (30 months' pay is maximum required). 
27 Id., § 4(i). 
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competitive disadvantage in today's 
global market. The contrary seems to be 
more true. The United States is the last 
major industrial democracy in the world 
that has not heeded the call of the Inter-
national Labor Organization for genera-
lized legal protections against the 
wrongful dismissal of employees.28 More-
500 
over, there is considerable evidence that a 
secure, contented work force makes for 
high productivity and quality output.29 
In this instance, doing the right thing 
may also be doing the smart thing. 
[The End] 
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